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WAGE AND HUMAN CAPITAL IN 
EXPORTING FIRMS IN MOROCCO 
 






A B S T R A C T 
 
We study the relationship of wages and education and training practices in 
Morocco in a context of trade and liberalisation reforms in a matched worker-firm data 
of eight exporting firms in two industrial sectors: Metallurgical-Electrical industries and 
Textile-Clothing. We find that the specific characteristics of the surveyed firms little 
affect worker wages. Moreover, the textile sector does not appear to be a significant 
channel for promoting skills in the economy. The minimal wage legislation is found to 
exert a positive pressure on wages. Also, some evidence of gender wage gap exists in 
the data. In these data, the effects of education and experience on wages are quite 
limited below the third quantile of wages, as well as the role of apprenticeship. In 
contrast, On-the-Job Training (OJT) much contributes to labour productivity as 
measured by wage levels. Most of the OJT is concentrated in the Metallurgical-
Electrical industries. Education is positively correlated to OJT. Moreover, estimates of 
explanatory relationships of task organisation (chain gangs, teams, supervision and 
executive workers) show the powerful sector and educational determinations of job 
organisation in the firms. Then, our results suggest that the impact of worker education 
may take indirect routes and not only appear through education coefficients in wage 
regressions. 
Keywords: wage, returns to human capital, matched worker-firm data, quantile 
regressions, Tunisia.  2
1.  Introduction 
Morocco is a semi-developed economy with a rapidly evolving working population. 
About one third of the Moroccans are under 15 years old, while the decreasing fertility rate 
is still at 3.1 percent in 2000.  Moreover, large inter-urban and rural-urban migrations take 
place. These features make the Moroccan labour market very tight in the peri-urban areas 
of cities where the exporting firms are often concentrated. However, if the job searchers are 
abundant, the qualification of Moroccan manpower is limited. More than 50 percent of 
adults are illiterate, much more for women. 
In this paper, we examine whether raising human capital of Moroccan workers is 
likely to augment their earnings in two specific industries: Textile-clothing and Electrical-
Mechanical industries. While half of the population works in agriculture, the Textile 
industry is a major employment sector (42 percent of industrial employment, 60 percent for 
female labour force). Textile production has increased by 7.75 percent per year between 
1986 and 1998, and it contributes to 11 percent of exports (Intermon, 2003). Most garment 
companies are small sized, family entities where the minimal wage, social security and 
contracts do not exist. However, a minority of modern firms concentrate most human 
capital investment in the textile sector. We shall focus on these firms and on the sector of 
electrical-mechanical industries, another pillar of exporting industry in Morocco. 
During the last decade, social indicators substantially improved due to growth in 
public social expenditure and focus on rural areas (The World Bank, 2001). Yet poverty 
and vulnerability were found to be on the rise. The incidence of poverty was 13.1 percent in 
1990/91 and 19 percent in 1998/99. Explanations of these high poverty figures can be 
found in sluggish GDP growth, drop in agricultural value-added partly caused by a series of 
droughts, collapse in employment creation and growing inequality in rural areas. This 
morose economic context hampered the progress of labour earnings. An open question is 
whether better education and training can lead to large wage increases in such situation. 
The restructuring of the Moroccan economy towards an export orientation started at 
least from 1984. Foreign trade has been liberalized as early as 1986. Moreover, from 1989, 
a large privatisation program of public firms went under way. All these economic 
transformations are expected to have affected wages and employment. Although aggregate  3
wages do not seem to have suffered much, wages in firms oriented towards export have 
been found heavily affected (Currie and Harrison, 1997). In this paper, we focus on the 
latter type of firms, which are believed to be more efficient than the standard firms, in part 
due to self selection (Clerides, Lach and Tybout, 1998). 
In  1986-91, one of the main factors explaining poverty reduction is the fast 
expansion of jobs in the manufacturing exportable sector, mostly clothing and textile and 
electrical-mechanical industries. The expansion in employment mainly came from low-
skill, low-pay temporary jobs. This may explain why real wages have almost stagnated in 
the 1990s. 
Can better education and on-the-job training provide an easy way to combat wage 
stagnation in the dynamic segment of the exporting industry in Morocco? We explore this 
question in this paper. We discuss wages and the labour market in Morocco in Section 2. In 
Section 3, we present the data and comment on the estimation results in Section 4. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes.  
2.  Wages and Labour Market 
In Morocco, the labour legislation underpins the level of wages. Unions have a 
strong influence and the presence of an official minimum wage (SMIG: salaire minimum 
interprofessionnel garanti) has played a crucial role for the formation of wages in the 
recent period. This has not always been the case since real wages of the Moroccan 
manufacturing sector declined while the real SMIG increased of about 25 percent during 
the 1980s. During the 1990s, the distribution of wages roughly stuck to the evolution of the 
SMIG. More precisely, the SMIG adjustments over time rather followed the evolutions of 
the mean urban wage more than proportionally (The World Bank, 1994). Thus, the 
differential between mean urban wage and SMIG partly vanished, which contributed to 
reducing the global dispersion of wages. Also, the increase of about 52 percent of the 
SMIG between 1989 and 1994 cannot be explained by the sole change in the cost of living 
(35 percent during this period). The monthly SMIG had not been updated (1659 Dirhams
1) 
                                                 
1 147 US dollars of 2001.  4
since 1996, but was raised by 10 percent in 2000. It is also important to note that the 
minimum wage is not effectively enforced in the informal sector of the economy. By 
contrast, it is fairly well implemented throughout the industrialised, unionised sectors in 
which most workers’ earnings stand above the minimum wage. These workers are 
generally paid between 13 and 16 months salary, including bonuses, each year. 
Lane, Hakim and Miranda (1999) underline the stagnation of the average wage in 
the manufacturing sector over the 1990s. Considerable gaps in average wages persist across 
sectors. The least remunerative industrial sectors are those of Leather and Confection, while 
the most profitable are the sectors of Drinks and Tobacco. The average wage in the latter 
sectors is, in 1995, more than three times higher than that of the Confection Sector
2. The 
stagnation of wages may be partly explained by the fact that the least remunerative 
industries have had the biggest part of job creation during the past decade. Then, the 
government may face a trade off between wage rise and limitations of unemployment. 
However, according to the World Bank (1996), the constant augmentation of the 
SMIG put pressure on urban unemployment and, in particular, on the least educated 
working population. The recommendations of the World Bank in 1996 were the fixation of 
the SMIG, thus increasing its gap with the average urban wage, in order to create jobs in 
the formal sector and raise the competitiveness on the international markets. In contrast, in 
1999, the World Bank underlines the necessity to reduce non-salary costs and to maintain 
an effective social welfare system. Hence, in Morocco, it seems that the priority today is 
not so much to focus the wage policy on the reduction of salary costs but rather to 
concentrate the efforts on raising workers’ productivity. A natural route to raise labour 
productivity is to enhance the human capital of workers. 
Skills of the workforce as well as exposure to competition (as in Clerides et al., 
1998) doubtless much explain wage disparities across sectors. Our survey covering two 
different sectors confirm it. Meanwhile, other factors might play a role, as the employment 
duration, the seasonal feature of jobs and on-the-job training. Indeed, legally, the minimum 
wage is not applied for certain types of employees, such as young workers below 18 years 
old, temporary workers or trainees. Furthermore, in 1986, at least half of the firms of the 
                                                 
2 In the industrial sector, the annual average wage - ratio of mass salary to permanent employment - amounted 
in 1995 to 34 963 dirhams, that is 2 914 monthly dirhams.   5
Moroccan private manufacturing sector and 40 percent of large companies (more than 100 
employees) pay unskilled workers an average wage lower than the SMIG
3. On the other 
hand, only 3 percent of the firms of this sector pay skilled workers below the minimum 
wage.  
The statutory frame of the Moroccan labour market is stiff. Until recently, working 
relations were governed by a legislation dating 1921 which strongly emphasised job 
security, so that it was very expensive to dismiss permanent workers
4. The law provided for 
a 48-hour maximum workweek with not more than 10 hours any single day, premium pay 
for overtime, paid public and annual holidays, and minimum conditions for health and 
safety, including the prohibition of night work for women and minors. As with other 
regulations and laws, these are not universally observed in the informal sector. 
Today, the labour market may benefit from the recently adopted labour code (July 
2003), which encourages flexibility and contains procedures for conciliation. The new code 
also reflects international conventions regarding the protection of children, women, 
handicapped people, workers and unions’ rights. 
However, for the reasons mentioned above, employers hesitate to hire permanent 
workers. The use of temporary workers gave considerable flexibility to the Moroccan 
labour market (Lane et al., 1999), although this flexibility has been acquired at the cost of 
employment stability and therefore of further investment in human capital
5. Indeed, job 
precariousness reduces personal implication of the worker for her training in the firm, but 
also the training investments by employers. Statistics of the Direction de la Statistique on 
creation of industrial employment in 1995 demonstrate the pre-eminence of seasonal jobs at 
a rate of 80 percent. These jobs, contributing at 19 percent to the total employment in the 
transformation industries, grew by 8 percent as compared to 1994, while permanent jobs 
increased only by 1 percent. 
                                                 
3 The World Bank (1994). Females are more likely than males to receive a wage below the SMIG.  
4 Workers are considered permanent when they can justify more than a year of job seniority.  
5 High welfare costs in the structured private sector (from 21,7 to 35 percent of gross wage) also increased the 
cost of permanent workers and discouraged firms of the informal sector to get integrated into the formal 
economy.  6
As for hiring, much of the working population expresses its desire to participate in 
the labour market through informal networks, frequently relying on family or personal 
contacts (El Aoufi, 1997). Finally, several studies showed that the former Labour Code, 
with its out-of-date dispositions combined with the slow pace of the law, generally 
contributed to making more expensive the management of human resources in Morocco 
(The World Bank, 1999). We now turn to the data we use. 
3.  The Moroccan matched data 
The objective of the survey was to constitute a sample of matched worker-firm data. 
These data were collected directly at the employee’s workplace
6. The questionnaire 
provides precise information about the career of each worker: individual characteristics 
(matrimonial situation, number of dependent children, geographic origin), wages, 
educational investment (years of schooling at the primary, secondary, and high school 
levels, university or vocational degrees), post-school training (possible periods of 
apprenticeship, preliminary internships, formal training within the current firm), total 
experience in the labour market and occupation in the current firm. Moreover, the data 
combine these workers’ characteristics with the characteristics of the firms in which they 
work. 
187 individuals were first interviewed during Summer 1997 (Nordman, 2000). 1997 
was an exceptionally good agricultural year, which stimulated the whole economy. Thus, 
the survey was completed in January 2000 while the employees of a new firm were added 
to the former sample. The final sample used in our study is then composed of 203 
individuals matched with 8 firms. The firms were selected on criteria of size (not less than 
50 employees), activity, vocation to export and capital ownership. The firms which were 
not exporting their production and those with entirely foreign capital were not retained in 
the  final  sample.   Employers  have  been  asked  about  the  characteristics  of  their  firm:  
                                                 
6 The methodology of the Moroccan survey is in Destré and Nordman (2002). Definitions and descriptive 
statistics of the variables used in this paper are in Tables 1 and 2 of the Appendix.  7
workforce composition, work organisation, training and communication practices, 
organisational or technical innovations, competitive situation of the firm. 
In these data, four firms belong to the Textile-clothing sector located in the area of 
Tanger and four firms to the Mechanics, Metallurgical, Electrical and Electronics Industries 
(IMMEE or Electical-Mechanical industries to shorten) in the region of Casablanca. The 
average size of the visited establishments is 230 employees. 54.1 percent of the employees 
work in the sector of textiles and 45.9 percent in the IMMEE. The proportion of female in 
the overall sample amounts to 49.8 percent.  
The average of the years of schooling is 9.8 years over the sample of employees 
(standard deviation 9.7). It is calculated from the workers’ questionnaires, using the 
available information on the highest level of education reached by the workers. This 
number of years of schooling is the same for male and female and corresponds to the first 
year of High School. Calculating this variable from the age acquired at the end of school 
(on which we deduct 6 years), the average number of years of schooling is close to 13 
years. We take into consideration the number of unsuccessful years of education
7 in order 
to avoid overestimating education
8. Then, the education variable we use is net from 
repeated classes. As a matter of fact, 5.4 percent of the workers have had no schooling, 16.7 
percent have completed only a primary level of education (1 to 5 years), 65.5 percent have 
obtained an educational level of 6 to 12 years (secondary school) and 11.8 percent have 
completed studies in higher education (university level). The proportion of employees with 
a vocational diploma related to their current job reaches 33 percent. 
The average tenure in the current firm is 6 years. It is only 4.3 years for females, but 
is higher for males (7.4 years). Total professional experience is on average 8.7 years (10 
years for males, 6 years for females). Previous experience off the current job is on average 
2.7 years, 1.2 years for females, and 3.9 years for males. 14 percent of the employees have 
worked in their firm for at least three years without any previous work experience. The 
ratio of tenure to the overall work experience, 69 percent, is explained by a large number of 
young, first-time workers. Indeed, the average age of the sample is only 30 years. Despite 
                                                 
7 Angrist and Lavy (1997) estimate the number of repeated classes at 2 to 3 years in Morocco.  
8 See on this point Behrman and Birdsall (1983).  8
this youth of the labour force, only six workers are observed under 17 years old, none under 
15 years old. Only 17 individuals are paid under the SMIG of 1996: 1659 Dirhams. Then, 
the studied firms do not seem to massively employ workers under age and pay worker 
below the SMIG, practices sometimes mentioned in Morocco (Intermon, 2003). 
Let us examine some characteristics of the wage sample. The average monthly wage 
declared by the employees is equivalent to 228 US dollars
9. On average male workers’ 
wages are 1.5 times higher than female workers’. The average wage in the IMMEE is 1.3 
times greater. Differences in human capital endowments across gender and sector 
contribute to explaining these wage differentials. Indeed, the workers’ average education in 
the textile sector is 11.1 years against 15 years in the IMMEE. Given that the clothing 
sector is the lowest wage manufacturing sector in Morocco, the inter-industry wage 
differential could explain some of the gender wage gap. However, the proportion of female 
workers in the two sectors is similar. This reinforces the suspicion about the persistence of 
wage discrimination against females even if some of the wage gap may stem from their 
lower experience in the labour market. 
4.  The Estimation Results 
The estimates are based on OLS and quantile regressions. For the OLS, firm fixed 
effects have been introduced in some version, and not in other ones, to assess the 
importance of using matched data. For OLS and quantile regressions, we present results 
with dummies of wage quartiles (indicating the relative position of each worker in the wage 
distribution) crossed with human capital variables and without quartiles. 
Interestingly, the role of firm fixed effects is limited in this Moroccan data set, as 
opposed to most results found in other countries. It has even been often stated that using 
matched data is important because of the systematic and strong effect of firm dummies in 
wage regressions (Abowd and Kramarz, 1999).  
                                                 
9 The average monthly wage corresponds to 1.6 times the minimum wage (SMIG). The declared monthly 
wages are those of May and March 1997 for 90% of the sample and of December 1999 for the rest.  9
Our results in Table 3 show that it is not systematically the case. In our regressions 
including firm dummies, only one or two of these dummies are significant at the 5 or 10 
percent levels. In this context, the individual characteristics appear prominent to explain 
wages, and firm characteristics have only minor input, at least for the observed firms. 
However, introducing firm fixed effects has a significant impact on the estimates of tenure 
coefficients, and on the coefficients of some organisation and training variables. This 
justifies considering the firm effect model as our preferred OLS estimates. 
In contrast, wage quartiles, crossed or not with human capital variables, are 
generally significant, notably for assessing the effects of education and experience. 
Omitting to distinguish between different domains of the wage distribution in this case 
would provide a biased picture of the returns to human capital
10. Then, we shall focus on 
comment of the OLS estimators on the equations incorporating quartile specific effects. 
Another way to account for differences in the effects of regressors on different areas 
of the wage distribution is to consider quantile regressions anchored at different wage 
quantiles (instead of introducing wage quartiles). In that case, this is the location of the 
conditional wage that determines the difference across estimates corresponding to different 
quartiles. The results again show that significant differences in estimated coefficients are 
obtained for differences in distribution locations. 
Let us now turn to Table 4 for analysing the effect of workers’ human capital 
characteristics across the wage distribution. The estimates show that there is a return to 
education for all quartiles and to a smaller extent to experience. For high wages in OLS 
estimates, returns to education are high, albeit they are much lower for the other quartiles.  
Returns to tenure and experience are also found higher for the fourth quantile in these 
estimates. In 1986-91, the main factor explaining poverty reduction is the fast expansion of 
jobs in the manufacturing exportable sector, mainly clothing and textile. The expansion in 
employment mainly came from low-skill, low-pay temporary jobs. Real wages have almost 
stagnated in the 1990s. These three stylised facts may explain some of our results, notably 
the limited impact of some human capital variables except for high wages. 
                                                 
10 Note, however, that only the dummy of the first quarter is significant for quartiles not crossed with human 
capital variables.  10
The effect of tenure is the least discriminatory across quartiles. The first quartile 
stands apart with significantly lower return to tenure. From a more general perspective, 
higher returns to human capital for high wage categories are consistent with finding in 16 
industrial countries, although this is not the case for the almost negligible returns we find 
for other education and experience in the other wage categories (Martins and Pereira, 
2004). 
The situation is less clear cut in quantile regression estimates showing that 
inferences based on wage location and on conditional wage locations can lead to 
substantially different conclusions. Also, quantile regression estimates are often less 
efficient than OLS in this context, which prevent from distinguishing significant effects 
across quantiles. Nonetheless, what arise with quantile regressions are higher returns of 
education and tenure for the low wages at the first conditional quartile as compared to 
conditional medians or third conditional quartile. What is the interpretation of such results? 
It may partly come from the lack of accuracy of quantile regression estimates with such 
small sample. Also, the first conditional quantiles may be characterised by greater 
unobserved social and environment handicaps, leaving more ground to returns to education 
and tenure.  
In this situation, the effect of human capital on wage inequality is unclear. However, 
one may expect an inequality raise with human capital if the strong effect of education on 
high wages dominates the other determinants of inequality. Thus, the third quartile appears 
to be rather disadvantaged in terms of the effects of the three observed dimensions of 
human capital: education, tenure and experience. This may be the sign of a human capital 
poverty trap preventing middle classes to access high wage jobs. 
Besides, if education, experience and tenure describe acquired human capital levels, 
more information can be extracted from observations on vocational training. On-the-job 
formal training corresponds to a strong positive and systematic impact on wage levels, in 
all specifications. Internship spells in past work positively and significantly affect wages 
except in the quantile regressions. On the contrary, past apprenticeship is never significant, 
neither in OLS estimates nor in quantile regressions. These results raise doubts about the 
usefulness of apprenticeship for working in this type of firms. 
Other worker characteristics are of interest as potential determinants of wage levels. 
Female workers are significantly less paid than male workers when considering OLS  11
estimates at 5 and 10 percent level. This wage gap situation is less significant when looking 
at the quantile regressions
11. Note that the coefficients of the gender dummies and other 
variables that are significant in OLS and not in quantile regressions become significant 
(with the same sign) as well in quantile regressions when the internship variable is omitted. 
As mentioned earlier, the lack of significance of quantile regression estimates may come 
from a too small sample size preventing us to disentangle the role of the introduced 
variables. Finally, executive or supervisor employees are much better paid, as expected. 
In that situation, promoting on-the-job training seems a more promising policy than 
general education, except for very high wages.  
What could explain the positive impact of OJT and almost null effect of education 
on wages for wage levels below the third quartile? It is difficult to answer with certainty 
with such a limited data. This feature is consistent with empirical evidence finding that 
trade liberalisation may generally deplete wages in the traded sector while high wages may 
rise, perhaps because imported technology raises the relative demand for highly skilled 
labour (Arbache, Dickerson and Green, 2004). Thus, the impact of general human capital 
may be stiffened by liberalisation for most wage categories and stimulated for high wages 
only which correspond to specific skills with increasing demand. As for OJT, since it can 
better be adjusted in the short run to the new international market demands than general 
education, it may affect positively wages at all wage levels. 
To better understand how OJT occurs, we estimate Probit equations of participation 
in this type of human capital accumulation. Column 1 of Table 5 shows the estimation 
results. Most socio-demographic characteristics (age, age squared, number of children and 
gender) and some labour market personal characteristics (internship, unemployment, 
tenure, experience, dummy for executive workers, proximity to SMIG) have non significant 
coefficients. In contrast, working in the Textile-clothing sector appears to be detrimental to 
participation in OJT, while the education level is positively correlated with participation. 
Thus, well educated workers in IMMEE are more likely to have been involved in OJT. This 
suggests first to coordinate long term general education policies with policies addressing 
vocational training. Moreover, OJT does not occur as densely in all industries and public 
                                                 
11 See Nordman (2004) for gender issues on this data.  12
encouragement to OJT should be designed so that it answers to genuine industrial needs. 
Interestingly, to be married is negatively associated with participation in OJT (at 10 percent 
level). Although this result is hard to interpret, it may come from the additional stress on 
time use caused by OJT, which is detrimental to family life. 
We now turn to the prevalence of two exclusive kinds of work organisation: chain 
gangs and work teams
12. Columns 2 of Table 6 show the estimation results of a 
multinomial logit (MNL) model where the base alternative is ‘working neither in chain 
gangs nor in work teams’. The relative probability of working in chain gangs is 
significantly positively associated (at 10 percent level) with the Textile-clothing sector, 
being female worker and having only studied in a Koranic school. It is negatively 
associated (significantly at 5 percent level) with past relevant internship, apprenticeship or 
being executive or supervisor. As for the probability of participation in team work, it is 
significantly negatively related to three variables: being supervisor, apprenticeship and 
working in the Textile-clothing. 
The MNL estimates well illustrate the links of the organisation of work tasks in the 
firm with the industrial technology on one hand, and the educational and training 
characteristics of workers. Other socio-demographic and labour market characteristics have 
insignificant effects. Thus, understanding workers remuneration should pass through the 
analysis of work organisation inside the firm sector by sector.  
We then consider the estimates of a probit model of being executive or supervisor. 
The results show that educated workers, with high tenure and experience, and having been 
in internship are significantly more likely to be executive or supervisor. This is consistent 
with the high human capital level necessary to occupy such position. It is interesting to 
observe that three given firms are associated with a significantly smaller probability of 
being executive or supervisor, all else being equals.  This can be explained by the following 
characteristics of the firms 1, 4 and 8. First, these three firms are older than the average 
with, respectively, 46, 20 and 18 years of existence
13. Their workers are older and have 
                                                 
12 An individual was considered as working in teams when he/she declared performing his/her tasks in 
collaboration with at least two other workers with similar activity. Workers in chain gangs are attached to 
standalone workstation and are subject to the rate of the production process.  
13 The sample mean is 17.6 years.  13
higher levels of experience than the workers in the other firms. In these firms, an old-
fashioned management system may imply few promotions according to merit. Firms 1, 4 
and 8 have fewer employees than the other firms of the sample (respectively 104, 100 and 
50 employees as compared to 228 on average). This may also diminish opportunities of 
internal promotions. Finally, they display the smallest proportions of employees working in 
chain gangs which, apparently, does not imply internal barriers for promotions.  
Finally, neither the other observed socio-demographic and human capital 
characteristics, nor the proximity to the SMIG, significantly affect the probability of being 
supervisor-executive. 
5.  Conclusion 
We study the relationship of wages and education and training practices in Morocco 
in a context of trade and liberalis ation reforms using a matched worker-firm data of eight 
exporting firms in two industrial sectors: Metallurgical-Electrical industries and Textile-
clothing. 
We find that the specific characteristics of the surveyed firms little affect worker 
wages as opposed to most results found in other countries. We also show that omitting to 
distinguish between different domains of the wage distribution would provide a biased 
picture of the returns to human capital. In these data, the effects of education and labour 
market experience on wages are quite limited below the third quantile of wages, as well as 
the role of apprenticeship. During the late 1980s and the 1990s, the fast expansion of 
employment in the manufacturing exportable sector, coming mainly from low-skill and 
low-pay temporary jobs, as well as the near stagnation of real wages may explain the 
limited impact of the commonly used human capital variables on low wages. In particular, 
the textile sector does not appear to be a significant channel for promoting skills in the 
economy.  
Moreover, one may expect an inequality surge with human capital if the strong 
effect of education on high wages dominates the other determinants of inequality. Indeed, 
the third quartile is characterised by low returns in the two dimensions of human capital  14
(education and experience). This may be the sign of a human capital poverty trap 
preventing middle classes to access high wage jobs. 
In contrast, on-the-job training (OJT) much contributes to labour productivity as 
measured by wage levels. Most of the OJT is concentrated in the Metallurgical-Electrical 
industries. Education is positively correlated to OJT. Our interpretation of the limited effect 
of education for wage levels below the third quartile is that the effect of general education 
may be stiffened by trade liberalisation for most wage categories and stimulated for high 
wages only, which correspond to specific skills with increasing demand. As for OJT, since 
it can swiftly be adjusted in the short run to international market demands, it can affect 
positively wages at all wage levels. 
The minimal wage legislation is found to exert a positive pressure on wages. This 
seems consistent with the fact that the SMIG adjustments over time followed the evolutions 
of the mean urban wage more than proportionally (The World Bank, 1994). Also, some 
evidence of gender wage gap exists in the data.  
Finally, estimates of explanatory relationships of task organisation (chain gangs, 
teams, supervision and executive workers) show the powerful sector and educational 
determinations of job organisation in the firms. Then, our results suggest that the impact of 
workers’ education may take indirect routes and not only appear through education 
coefficients in wage regressions.  
Mechanisms for closing the skill gap in Morocco have traditionally been articulated 
in policy designs in terms of supply side reform: improving the quality of the educational 
system so that more young people become educated, and helping existing workers to gain 
qualifications through formal learning processes, such as courses and/or accreditation 
services provided by the OFPPT (Office de la Formation Professionnelle et de la 
Promotion du Travail). However, such provision is now characterised as being so subject to 
supplier capture (the diversity of vocational schools and diploma, either private or public) 
that it is not always responsive to the needs of employers. Thus, the perceived solution to 
the Moroccan’s skill and productivity problems is still cast in terms of further reform of the 
qualifications system and supply side delivery mechanisms. Nevertheless, our results 
suggest the importance of work organisation and on-the-job training in skill formation 
process. In particular, there has been a growing interest in workplace learning processes 
that are variously described as ‘informal’ or ‘nonformal’ in the literature. For instance,  15
several empirical studies show that the impact of training is greater on the firm 
performances when training takes place in connection with work organisational changes 
and comes along with an evolution of the employment structures (Black and Lynch, 1996; 
Fleisher, Dong and Liu, 1996).  
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Appendix 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the workers’ characteristics 
Definitions of the variables  Mean Std  dev.  min  max 
       
Age of individual (AGE) 30.41  8.23  16  59 
Sex (FEMALE, 1: female; 0 male; conversely for MALE) 0.46  0.50  0  1 
Geographical origin (PROVE, 1: rural area; 0 otherwise)  0.82  0.37  0  1 
Matrimonial situation (MARI, 1: if married; 0 if divorced, widowed or single)  0.42  0.49  0  1 
Number of dependant children (ENFT) 0.79  1.36  0  7 
Individual never went to school, neither general nor Koranic (ANALPHA, 1: yes; 0 otherwise)  0.05 0.22  0  1 
Individual went to Koranic school only (KORAN, 1: yes; 0 otherwise)  0.10  0.30  0  1 
Years of schooling (EDUCATION) 9.78  9.78  0  18 
Previous apprenticeship in a firm (APPRENTI, 1: yes; 0 otherwise)  0.18  0.38  0  1 
Periods of internship related to the current job (STAGA, in years)  0.14  0.33  0  2 
Periods of internship not related to the current job (STAGAN, in years)  0.06  0.29  0  2 
Vocational degree related to the current job (ETUTPA; 1: yes; 0 otherwise)  0.33  0.47  0  1 
Vocational degree not related to the current job (ETUTP; 1: yes; 0 otherwise)   0.13  0.34  0  1 
Periods of unemployment (CHOMA, in years)  1.53  2.28  0  10 
Previous relevant experience (EMSIM,  1: yes; 0 otherwise)  0.46  0.50  0  1 
Previous potential professional experience (EXPERIENCE, in years)  5.49  7.12  0  49.08 
Date of start in the current firm (ENTREE)   1990.69  5.11  1975  1998 
Tenure in the current firm (TENURE, in years)  6.00  5.30  0  21.25 
Formal On-the-Job Training in the current firm (FORMAD ; 1: yes; 0 otherwise)   0.30  0.45  0  1 
Formal On-the-Job Training in the current firm (FORMAA, in years)    0.12  0.249  0  2 
Work in team (EQUIPE, 1: yes; 0 otherwise)  0.41  0.49  0  1 
Work in chain gangs (CHAINE, 1: yes; 0 otherwise)  0.15  0.36  0  1 
Executive or supervisor (ENCADR, 1: yes; 0 otherwise)  0.24  0.42  0  1 
       
Proximity to the minimum wage (SMIG, 1: if 1600<=SAL<=1700; 0 otherwise)  0.17  0.37  0  1 
       
Firms’ fixed effects       
Firm 1   0.079 0.270  0  1 
Firm 2  0.197 0.399  0  1 
Firm 3  0.143 0.351  0  1 
Firm 4  0.133 0.340  0  1 
Firm 5  0.167 0.374  0  1 
Firm 6  0.099 0.299  0  1 
Firm 7  0.103 0.305  0  1 
Firm 8  0.079 0.270  0  1 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of monthly wages (in dirhams) 
Definitions of the variables  Mean Std  dev. min  max 
        
Monthly wage   2689  2019  750  20000
Monthly wage in IMMEE  3101  1930  750  12000
Monthly wage in Textile-clothing  2281  2030  750  20000
Mean wage in:        
Firm 1 (IMMEE)  4586  3237  2200  12000
Firm 2 (IMMEE)  2337  1120  750  7500 
Firm 3 (IMMEE)  3398  1791  1700  9000 
Firm 4 (Textile-clothing)  2192  761  1150  5000 
Firm 5 (Textile-clothing)  1974  813  750  5000 
Firm 6 (Textile-clothing)  1888  519  1500  3500 
Firm 7 (Textile-clothing)  3267  4168  1040  20000
Firm 8 (IMMEE)  2984  1015  1250  4500  
Table 3. Wage equations 
Dependent variable: Log monthly wage 
  OLS 
Quantile regressions 
(bootstrap: 20) 























Constant  6.970*** 6.906*** 7.382*** 7.368*** 6.961*** 7.117*** 7.326*** 
  (66.01) (61.41) (49.13) (45.79) (50.11) (46.90) (39.88) 
EDUCATION  0.043*** 0.045*** 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.034***  0.029*  0.023 
  (6.03) (6.34) (5.53) (5.39) (3.11) (1.89) (1.49) 
Quartile1  _ _  -0.296* -0.337*  _ _ _ 
      (1.71) (1.83)     
Quartile2  _ _  0.065 0.034  _ _ _ 
      (0.33) (0.17)     
Quartile3  _ _  0.312 0.268  _ _ _ 
      (1.53) (1.32)     
EDUCATION*Quartile1 _  _  -0.047*** -0.037***    _ _ 
      (4.13) (3.12)     
EDUCATION*Quartile2 _  _  -0.040*** -0.033**    _ _ 
      (3.11) (2.54)     
EDUCATION*Quartile3 _  _  -0.045*** -0.038***    _ _ 
      (3.55) (3.04)     
TENURE  0.034***  0.048*** 0.023*  0.031**  0.047*** 0.030*  0.023 
   (2.73) (3.85) (1.76) (2.26) (2.83) (1.76) (0.89) 
TENURE
2  -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 
   (0.14) (1.24) (0.27) (0.59) (1.28) (0.45) (0.09) 
TENURE*Quartile1 _  _  -0.012 -0.008  _ _ _ 
      (0.62)  (0.43)    
TENURE*Quartile2 _  _  -0.020* -0.017  _ _ _ 
      (1.69)  (1.38)    
TENURE*Quartile3 _  _  -0.018** -0.019**  _ _ _ 
      (2.22)  (2.32)    
EXPERIENCE  0.022*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.026***  0.011  0.016  0.016 
   (3.15) (3.55) (4.03) (4.04) (1.13) (1.50) (1.10) 
EXPERIENCE
2  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
   (1.40) (1.35) (0.30) (0.16) (0.12) (0.84) (0.32)  
EXPERIENCE*Quartile1 _  _  -0.022*** -0.018**  _ _ _ 
      (2.81)  (2.24)    
EXPERIENCE*Quartile2 _  _  -0.023*** -0.024***  _ _ _ 
      (3.24)  (3.39)    
EXPERIENCE*Quartile3 _  _  -0.024*** -0.023***  _ _ _ 
      (3.29)  (3.19)    
0.194** 0.243**  0.193***  0.210***  0.335***  0.364***  0.213  On-the-Job Training  
(FORMAA)  (2.03) (2.30) (2.96) (2.71) (3.03) (3.44) (1.40) 
0.324*** 0.317*** 0.116*** 0.124*** 0.194***  0.344**  0.417***  Dummy for executive or 
supervisor (ENCADR)  (5.88) (5.95) (2.94) (2.87) (2.74) (2.34) (3.26) 
-0.176*** -0.161***  -0.071**  -0.066*  -0.111  -0.118  -0.113*  Dummy for female  
(3.73) (3.22) (2.18) (1.71) (1.36) (1.51) (1.66) 
0.043  0.075 0.314***  0.295*** 0.043  -0.011  -0.045  Dummy for proximity to 
minimum wage (SMIG)  (0.68) (1.29) (5.14) (4.83) (0.88) (0.18) (0.64) 
0.085 0.089 0.036 0.049 0.083 0.109 0.027  Dummy for past apprenticeship 
(APPRENTI) 
(1.38) (1.54) (0.87) (1.15) (1.38) (1.09) (0.51) 
0.170**  0.173***  0.086*  0.107**  0.066 0.091 0.185  Past work relevant internship 
(STAGA)  
(2.53) (2.77) (1.87) (2.26) (0.51) (0.80) (0.99) 
_  0.072  _  -0.035 0.007 0.212 0.260  Firm1 
  (0.62)    (0.39) (0.04) (1.17) (1.10) 
_  -0.182**  _  -0.124* -0.192 -0.167* -0.130  Firm2 
  (2.03)    (1.84) (1.19) (1.76) (1.16) 
_  0.233***  _  0.013 0.198*  0.216**  0.302**  Firm3 
  (2.72)    (0.19) (1.71) (2.28) (2.05) 
_  -0.147  _  -0.082 -0.134 -0.078 -0.137  Firm4 
  (1.53)    (1.16) (1.32) (0.76) (1.02) 
_  0.036  _  -0.035 0.049 0.062 0.004  Firm5 
  (0.46)    (0.61) (0.37) (0.92) (0.08) 
_  -0.032  _  -0.021 -0.140 -0.065 0.018  Firm7 
  (0.35)    (0.32) (1.11) (0.54) (0.16) 
_  -0.117  _  -0.161* -0.020  0.041  0.003  Firm8 
  (1.08)    (1.94) (0.11) (0.25) (0.02) 
 
Observations  203 203 203 203 203 203 203 
R-squared  0.63 0.71 0.85 0.86     
Pseudo R-squared         0.40  0.46  0.52 
 








Table 4. Returns to human capital across wage-quartiles (with firm fixed effects) 
 
  OLS Quantile  regressions 
 Quartiles    
 
1 2 3 4 
Mean






Variables           





nd 0.0080  0.0268  0.0154  0.0352 0.0270  0.0241
ns 
EXPERIENCE




 a: returns are computed at the average point of the sub-sample. 
b : mean of the effects for the different quartiles.
  
ns : no significantly different from zero at 10% level.  
nd : no significantly different from the coefficient of the 4
th quartile at 10% level.  
 
 Table 5. Probit and Multinomial Logit Models 
 
(2) 
MNL for the probability of working in 
 
(1) 
Probit for the probability of receiving On-
the-Job Training 





Probit for the probability of being 
Executive or Supervisor 








-1.7751   
Constant 
(1.54) (1.78)  (1.28)  (1.53) 
0.2436 5.2860***  0.4507  -0.3505 
Dummy for female  
(0.79) (4.81)  (0.68)  (1.08) 
0.1892 -0.7233  -0.1626  -0.0973 
AGE 
(0.83) (1.64)  (0.38)  (1.46) 
-0.0054 0.0053  -0.0001  _ 
AGE
2 
(1.41) (0.73)  (0.02)   
-0.8378* 1.4159  -0.0917  0.2403 
Matrimonial situation (MARI) 
(1.84) (1.51)  (0.11)  (0.65) 
0.4034 -0.4253  -0.2508  0.2594  Number of dependent 
children (ENFT)  (1.64) (1.20)  (0.52)  (1.35) 
_ 0.4097  -0.8977  -0.5065 
Geographical origin (PROVE) 
 (0.44)  (1.01)  (1.07) 
_ 2.1059*  -1.3091  0.6969 
KORAN 
 (1.68)  (1.03)  (1.30) 
_ 3.5479  -44.3956  _ 
ANALPHA 
 (1.04)  (0.00)   
0.3476*** -0.0050  -0.1508  0.3135*** 
EDUCATION 
(3.18) (0.03)  (0.80)  (3.97) 
_ -2.6085***  -2.2813*  _  Past apprenticeship 
(APPRENTI)   (2.82)  (1.93)   
-0.0162 -0.8369  -0.0314  -0.4853  Non job related vocational 
degree (ETUTP)  (0.04) (0.88)  (0.04)  (1.19) 
-0.6039 -1.1148  0.3522  _  Job related vocational degree 
(ETUTPA)  (1.42) (1.14)  (0.47)   
-0.0060 -3.5197**  -0.2400  0.7666**  Past work relevant internship 
(STAGA)  (0.01) (2.46)  (0.30)  (2.10) 
-0.2793 _  _  _  Past work irrelevant 
internship (STAGAN)  (0.66)      
Periods of unemployment  0.0797  0.1053  0.1507  _  
(CHOMA)  (0.76) (0.62)  (0.80)   
0.1236 0.4177  -0.1051  0.1773** 
TENURE 
(1.53) (1.58)  (0.50)  (2.54) 
_ -0.0045  0.0112  _ 
TENURE
2 
 (0.36)  (1.13)   
0.0577 0.1191  -0.0826  0.1244** 
EXPERIENCE 
(0.62) (0.61)  (0.40)  (1.98) 
_ 0.0014  0.0101  _ 
EXPERIENCE
2 
 (0.27)  (1.17)   
0.0989 -6.9549***  -1.4770**  _  Dummy for executive or 
supervisor (ENCADR)  (0.28) (3.63)  (2.23)   
0.1856 1.0234  -0.1518  -0.6726  Proximity to the minimum 
wage (SMIG)  (0.37) (0.98)  (0.13)  (1.23) 
-1.7703*** 1.7931*  -3.2312***  _ 
Dummy for Textile-clothing 
(4.73) (1.67)  (3.66)   
_ _  _  -1.7106** 
Firm 1 
     (2.50) 
_ _  _  -0.2236 
Firm 2 
     (0.41) 
_ _  _  -0.8253 
Firm 3 
     (1.46) 
_ _  _  -2.7288*** 
Firm 4 
     (2.86) 
_ _  _  -0.0652 
Firm 5 
     (0.11) 
_ _  _  -0.9019 
Firm 7 
     (1.47) 
_ _  _  -2.6657*** 
Firm 8 
     (3.22) 
 
Pseudo R-squared  0.54 0.5464  0.40 
Log likelihood  -56.30  -93.88  -67.10 
Observations 203  203  203 
Absolute value of z statistics are in brackets. *, ** and *** mean significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. In the MNL model, the reference group is individuals 
‘working neither in chain gangs nor in work teams’. 